This is the second part of Barry Zellen's column on the U.S. government's Arctic policy.

In its 2024 Arctic Strategy, the Pentagon reveals its strategic obsession with China has clouded its judgment. It's not the first time American policy has been rooted in a grand illusion. This was evident during its tragic, two-decade long Vietnam intervention, as it was again during its tragic, two-decade long intervention in Afghanistan.

Breaking with previous Arctic strategies, the U.S. Department of Defence's (DoD) 2024 strategy elevates non-Arctic China with not a hectare of Arctic territory under its flag to the top of its threat matrix, above even mighty Russia, the largest of the Arctic states with sovereign control over more than half the Arctic region.

In its strategy, DoD describes China鈥檚 Arctic presence, noting: 鈥淭he PRC (People's Republic of China) seeks to bolster its operational expertise in the Arctic, where its presence, while limited, is increasing. The PRC operates three icebreakers: the Xue Long, Xue Long 2, and Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di, which enable the PRC鈥檚 dual civil-military research efforts in the Arctic. Over the course of the PRC鈥檚 13 Arctic research expeditions to date, the vessels have tested unmanned underwater vehicles and polar-capable fixed-wing aircraft, among other activities. People鈥檚 Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels have also demonstrated the capability and intent to operate in and around the Arctic region through exercises alongside the Russian Navy over the past several years."

Not mentioned, however, is that China鈥檚 increasing Arctic presence mirrors that of dozens of other non-Arctic states that, like China, hold observer status at
the Arctic Council, with an Arctic presence that dates back to the interwar years of the early 20th Century as evident in their status as signatories to the Spitzbergen Treaty that internationalized access to Svalbard鈥檚 economy, part of a global commons in the polar world that many nations, not just China, embrace.

Moreover, as noted above, DoD鈥檚 concern with China鈥檚 鈥渄ual civil-military鈥� efforts in Arctic research mirrors that of the United States and all of its Arctic and non-Arctic partners who until recently worked together to span old East-West divisions in the Arctic.

Much of the U.S. polar research community in the academic world depends on U.S. government and military support for ice breaker access, as well as other infrastructure and transportation support from the Thule Air Base in north Greenland to Antarctica. Just as the Pacific Ocean is not, and never truly was, an American lake despite the predominance of U.S. naval power in the post-World War II Pacific, the Arctic is not and has never been an American lake as Russia flanks more than half of the Arctic basin, far surpassing America鈥檚 or its allies鈥� Arctic littoral territories.

Tiny Iceland in the North Atlantic barely touches the Arctic, with only its northernmost island of Grimsey straddling the Arctic Circle, and Denmark is Arctic only through its colonial possession of Greenland. Sweden and Finland have no coastal access to the Arctic Ocean at all, which explains why, at that first and surprisingly divisive (within the West) Arctic Ocean Conference held in Ilulissat, Greenland on May 27-29, 2008, these three Arctic states weren鈥檛 even invited, causing much diplomatic tension within the now-NATO aligned Arctic.

Within this context, China鈥檚 Arctic interest and its limited, seasonal, and mobile presence whether by ice breaker, submarine, aircraft, or visiting researchers seasonally resident on the Arctic territory of a sovereign host nation, seems at best a 'sideshow' and its placement as the top concern regarding the Arctic strategic environment as presented in the 2024 DoD s Arctic strategy is at best illogical, and at worst a dangerous strategic distortion of reality.

The 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy further elaborates its concern with China鈥檚 Arctic interest and presence: 鈥淎lthough the vast majority of the Arctic is under the jurisdiction of sovereign states, the PRC seeks to promote the Arctic region as a 鈥榞lobal commons鈥� in order to shift Arctic governance in its favour. The PRC鈥檚 2018 Arctic Policy claims non-Arctic states should contribute to the region鈥檚 鈥榮hared future for mankind鈥� due to the Arctic鈥檚 global significance. Its 鈥楶olar Silk Road鈥� has been used to gain a footing in the Arctic by pursuing investments in infrastructure and natural resources, including in the territory of NATO Allies."

It should be mentioned that two-term Alaska governor Wally Hickel, who served as Interior Secretary in U.S. president Richard Nixon鈥檚 cabinet and famously saw not only the Alaska Pipeline be built on his watch but also welcomed the historic passage of the first comprehensive Arctic land claim accord with indigenous peoples of the Arctic known as the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971, promoted Alaska and the Arctic as not only part of the global commons, but the solution to what ecologist Garrett Hardin called the 鈥渢ragedy of the commons,鈥� as Hickel developed in his 2002 book Crisis in the Commons: The Alaska Solution.

The view of the Arctic as a global commons is not a nefarious plot to undermine American hegemony, but the logical outcome of a generation of globalization linking East and West since the Cold War ended; America鈥檚 strategic anxiety over a thawing Arctic鈥檚 central position in the globalized world and China鈥檚 embrace of this is, reveals weakness not strength, trepidation not confidence.

U.S. policy toward both Russia鈥檚 controversial claims that the 快盈v3 Sea Route is internal to Russia and Canada鈥檚 comparable claim that the Northwest Passage is internal to Canada, which rejects both nations鈥� claims, counterargues that these waterways are in fact part of the world ocean and thus part of the global commons. It is thus hypocritical of Washington to criticize China for advocating a similar view. Indeed, if America and its allies sufficiently invested in their own Arctic territories, built sufficient Arctic infrastructure, and developed remote Arctic economies to lift Arctic peoples out of endemic and persistent poverty, they would be in a better position to defend such a view.

But China鈥檚 pragmatic realization that there is mutual opportunity for investing in the Arctic that can benefit Arctic peoples long neglected by their sovereign states is only possible because of such neglect and long periods of Arctic disinterest in the United States and other Arctic states for their far northern peripheries. If the Arctic less resembled the third world, having earned its own and even less developed designation as the 鈥渇ourth world,鈥� and more resembled the first or even the second worlds, such a position would have more legitimacy.

Indeed, there would be few inroads for China鈥檚 Polar Silk Road had America and its allies shown true and sustained interest in their respective Arctics 鈥� and had climate change not opened up so much of the Arctic to external access, it is likely that the region鈥檚 relative neglect would have continued. Even when there is evidence of a commitment to the Arctic and its development in the West, as seen in periods of resource booms from Klondike gold rush to the North Slope oil rush to Nunavut鈥檚 uranium rush to Greenland鈥檚 rare earth metals rush, such interest is usually ephemeral, and marked by clashes of interest between Indigenous peoples, non-Indigenous settlers, external commercial interests, and governments, part of an ongoing dialectical interaction that endeavors to align disparate interests but often results in economic stagnation and protracted underdevelopment, as seen with repeated failures despite intensive reconciliation efforts to build a pipeline connecting Canadian Arctic petroleum resources to southern markets.

Let鈥檚 Welcome 鈥� Not Hinder 鈥� China鈥檚 Historic Rise

If anything, China is rising to the challenge of Arctic development made possible by failures in the West to fully develop its own remote Arctic territories. China should therefore be welcomed as an economic partner that reflects China鈥檚 global stature and upon which so many western nations depend, and not as a spoiler intent on disrupting the Arctic status quo or tilting regional governance in its favour. Indeed, China鈥檚 participation in Arctic economic activities, and engaging regional governance structures as it does elsewhere in the world, is part and parcel of being a global power. It is time to put such anti-China prejudices aside.

Just as it is illogical to see China sit atop DoD鈥檚 list of concerns with the Arctic strategic environment, it is illogical to see Russia, the largest Arctic state by far, come second after China on DoD鈥檚 strategic map of the Arctic, when China is a non-Arctic state. Indeed, it is profoundly worrisome that America, universally considered the world鈥檚 greatest military power 鈥� fresh from its 2021 strategic defeat in Afghanistan against the materially inferior Taliban, over two decades after it invaded Iraq on faulty intelligence of a non-existent WMD threat, and 70 years after it stumbled into its disastrous Vietnam intervention 鈥� still can鈥檛 get its priorities right or assess the strategic environment objectively in a manner that correlates with reality.

With such a long string of military defeats to weaker adversaries from Vietnam to Afghanistan behind it, and a proxy war in Ukraine with Russia that has failed keep Ukraine whole and yet risks escalation to general war, it is disconcerting to find DoD鈥檚 2024 Arctic policy so badly inverted, and so dangerously decoupled from strategic reality.